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THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
"TURNERIZATION" OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS
James E. Robertson *
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kimberlin v. United States Department of Justice,' the highly
respected Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
swept aside constitutional objections to the Federal Bureau of Pris-
ons' "No Frills" regulations banning electric or electronic musical
instruments. Upon applying the multi-factor test articulated by the
Supreme Court in Turner v. Safley,2 the Kimberlin court found the
regulations "reasonably related to the asserted goal-conserving
correctional funds."' The court reached this conclusion without
needing any facts. "Common sense," posited the three-judge
panel, "tells us ... that a prisoner's possession and use of an elec-
tric guitar costs correctional institutions money for electricity, up-
keep, storage and supervision."4 The plaintiff's First Amendment
rights virtually dissolved into a tautology, and meanness became a
constitutionally acceptable, symbolic condition of confinement.
The Kimberlin ruling can be read as an exemplar of three dom-
inant features of prisoners' rights adjudication during the tenure
of the Rehnquist Court: (1) the seemingly ubiquitous application
of the deferential, rational-basis test enunciated in Turner v. Safley
("the Turner test"); (2) the trivialization of "legitimate" penal objec-
tives, which are nonetheless allowed to trump prisoners' rights, in-
cluding those "fundamental" to ordered liberty; and (3) a
willingness to forego empirically based "facts" in favor of prison
officials' asserted "truths." The interlocking nature of these prac-
tices has synergized the Turner test, resulting in the "Turnerization"
of prisoners' rights.
This Article documents and critiques the Rehnquist Court's
primary correctional legacy: the Turnerization of prisoners' rights.
Part II of the Article provides historical context by presenting the
* Distinguished Professor of Corrections & Correctional Law, Minnesota State
University; editor-in-chief, The Criminal Law Bulletin; contributing editor, Criminal Jus-
tice Review. This Article is dedicated to my law tutor at Oxford University, Professor
Roger Hood, upon his retirement.
1 318 F.3d. 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
2 482 U.S. 78, 89-92 (1987).
3 Kimberlin, 318 F.3d at 233.
4 Id. (citing Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
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genealogy of the Turner test, concluding with a description of its
four parts. Part III maps the expansion of the Turner test beyond
its First Amendment base into a variety of constitutional issues.
Part TV critiques the underpinnings of the Turner test, finding that
Turnerization has given legitimacy to a thin, underenforced fed-
eral Constitution for prisoners. Part V concludes the Article by es-
tablishing that Turnerization represents a normative strain in the
bureaucratic state, with the Turner test advancing the manage-
ment of prisoners as a permanent underclass and thereby inflicting
great damage to the grundnorm-or basic norm-of prisoners'
rights.
II. THE ORIGINS OF TURNERIZATION
The Framers did not envisage a nation where more than two
million detainees and inmates reside in warehouse-like institu-
tions.5 At its birth, the new republic had yet to be populated by a
fortress-like prison. Jails had long operated in the Old and New
Worlds, mostly in a manner whereby filth, disease, and despair
plagued the ranks of their wards.6 By the eighteenth century, the
management of jails epitomized arbitrary government'-the very
evil that inspired the Bill of Rights.' Hamilton, in The Federalist No.
5 See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLE-
TIN: PRISONERS IN 2004 at 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs//pub/
pdf/p04.pdf (delineating the size of the prison population). The Author has de-
scribed the "warehouse prison" as follows:
During the 1980s three forces transformed the prison: 1) a dramatic rise
in the incarceration rate; 2) disillusionment with rehabilitation; and 3)
a penal strategy that manages the underclass. Their marriage produced
the "human warehouse with a junglelike underground." Seemingly
powerless to combat the rampant violence and pervasive idleness that
often accompanies incarceration, the warehouse prison-type operates
without the pretense that it does anything other than store and recycle
offenders.
James E. Robertson, Houses of the Dead: Warehouse Prisons, Paradigm Change, and the
Supreme Court, 34 Hous. L. REV. 1003, 1014 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
6 See Edward M. Peters, Prison Before Prison: The Ancient and Medieval Worlds, in THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 3 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995)
(describing early approaches to incarceration).
7 See, e.g., Matthew W. Meskell, The History of Prisons in the United States from 1877 to
1977, 51 STAN. L. REv. 839, 848 (1999) ("Colonial jails, like their English predeces-
sors, were run mostly for profit. Jailers extorted often exorbitant sums from those in
their care for food, clothing, and luxury goods like alcohol and tobacco.") (footnote
omitted).
8 See, e.g., Alfredo Garcia, The Fifth Amendment: A Comprehensive Historical Approach,
29 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 223 (1998) ("Power was the antithesis of liberty. Governmen-
tal power had to be checked, and curtailing the ability of the state to wield a coercive
mechanism which meant the difference between life or death was critical. The spe-
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84 quoting Blackstone, wrote that "confinement of the person, by
secretly hurrying him to gaol, where his sufferings are unknown or
forgotten," constituted "a more dangerous engine of arbitrary govern-
ment" than punishment.9 For good reason, gaolers owed their
wards the duty at common law to provide a habitable environ-
ment.'0 By the beginning of the twentieth century that duty ac-
quired considerable breadth: In Westbrook v. State" the Georgia
Supreme Court announced that a prisoner "has all the rights of the
ordinary citizen which are not expressly or by necessary implication
taken from him by law."' 2
A. The Hands-Off Doctrine
By the 1930s, the "hands-off' doctrine had taken hold in lower
federal courts. 13 It posited that federalism created a constitutional
roadblock to adjudicating the merits of prisoner complaints
brought from state prisons and jails. 4 Lower federal courts also
advanced a host of other reasons for the hands-off doctrine, includ-
ing judges' lack of familiarity with prison life 5 and that time con-
suming, frivolous pro se filings would clog the courts. 6 Some
courts effected a hands-off policy by advancing the elusive distinc-
cific protections embedded in the Bill of Rights took root and expanded as the new
nation grappled with the proper constraints upon the coercive power wielded by the
government.").
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 437-38 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 2d
ed. 1987).
10 See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (acknowledging a consti-
tutional basis for "the common law view that 'it is but just that the public be required
to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of liberty, care for
himself") (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (1926)); ExparteJenkins,
58 N.E. 560, 561 (Ind. App. 1900) (holding that the wife of a lynched prisoner could
sue a sheriff for breach of "the duty he owes the prisoner himself to exercise reasona-
ble and ordinary care to protect the prisoner's life and health").
11 66 S.E. 788 (Ga. 1909).
12 Id. at 585. This ruling hardly comports with infamous and much-repeated dic-
tum in Ruffin v. Commonwealth that inmates are but "slaves of the State." 62 Va. (21
Gratt.) 790, 796 (Va. 1871). Contemporary casebooks have overstated its influence
given that CorpusJuris in 1917 insisted that the case incorrectly stated the legal status
of prisoners. Donald H. Wallace, Prisoners' Rights: Historical Views, in CORRECTIONAL
CONTEXTS 248, 248-52 (James W. Marguart & Jonathan R. Sorensen eds., 1997).
13 See generally Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An Analysis
of the Decline of the "Hands-Off' Doctrine, 1977 DET. C. L. REV. 795 (1977).
14 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lawrence v. Ragen, 323 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir.
1963); Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 1954).
15 See, e.g., Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951); see also NAT'L ADVI-
SORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 18 (1973)
("Judges felt that correctional administration was a technical matter to be left to ex-
perts rather than to courts ....").
16 See, e.g., Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1951).
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tion between rights and privileges; the latter invariably formed the
gravamen of the complaint, causing the plaintiff to lose.
17
Prisoners confined during the era of the hands-off doctrine
experienced a host of inhumane acts, including racial segrega-
tion; 8 poor medical care;" inmate-on-inmate assault; 2° staff brutal-
ity and indifference; 2' and squalor.22 The sordid reality of prison
life under the hands-off doctrine came to the fore in a 1967 presi-
dential commission that found confinement "at best barren and
futile, at worst unspeakably brutal and degrading. 23
Between 1967 and 1977 the federal judiciary underwent a his-
toric transformation. It abandoned the hands-off doctrine and
constitutionalized most aspects of incarceration, such as classifica-
tion of inmates; 24 discipline;25 medical care; 26 access to the
courts; 27 religious freedom; 2 exercise; 29 prison rules; ° treatment
of pretrial detainees; 31 speech;3 2 search and seizure;33 food, shelter,
clothing, and sanitation; 34 and the totality of living conditions.35
Several lower federal courts also assumed control of entire state
17 See, e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684, 687 (8th Cir. 1967); Parks v. Ciccone,
281 F. Supp. 805, 809-10 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
18 See, e.g., JOHN IRWIN, PRISONS IN TURMOIL 9 (1980) (observing that blacks and
whites resided in separate sections of the "Big House" prison-type); MICHAEL WELCH,
CORRECTIONS: A CRITICAL APPROACH 369 box 13-2 (1996) (observing that until the
1960s, institutional racism could be found throughout the prison).
19 See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding an ab-
sence of "prompt and efficient" medical care in Mississippi prisons); Newman v. Ala-
bama, 349 F. Supp. 278, 281 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (finding that the one hospital for
Alabama's inmates employed no full-time physicians).
20 See, e.g., Alan J. Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System and Sheriffs
Vans, 6 TRANS-ACTION 8, 9 (1968). In Philadelphia's jails "virtually every slightly-built
young man committed by the courts is sexually approached within a day or two after
his admission to prison." Id. at 9.
21 See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1968) (banning the
whipping of inmates).
22 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
23 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967).
24 See, e.g., Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975).
25 See, e.g., Knell v. Bensinger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1973).
26 See, e.g., Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972).
27 See, e.g., Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1972).
28 See, e.g., Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23, 28-29 (5th Cir. 1969).
29 See, e.g., Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1129-30 (E.D. La. 1971).
30 See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 272-74 (D. Md. 1972).
3' See, e.g., Conklin v. Hancock, 334 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (D.N.H. 1971).
32 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 202 (2d Cir. 1971).
33 See, e.g., Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1975).
34 See, e.g., Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part sub
nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978).
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prison systems through all-encompassing structural injunctions.3 6
B. "The Cry of Wolfish"
By 1977, lower federal courts had written a broad charter of
rights for prisoners in piecemeal fashion.3 7 The Southern District
of New York's ruling in United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi"8 demon-
strated the expanse of this charter. While the court spoke of defer-
ence to "the primary authority and expertise of those charged with
building and running the prisons,"39 the decision accorded no
weight to the judgments of prison officials when "made arbitrarily
or in conflict with particular rights given by Constitution or stat-
ute."4 For pretrial detainees, the charter of rights forbade "any
deprivation or restriction of... rights beyond those which are nec-
essary for confinement alone, [and any deprivation or restriction]
must be justified by a compelling necessity."'" This standard effect-
ively dictated the least-restrictive form of confinement for pretrial
detainees unless their keepers advanced a strong case to the con-
trary-one not merely based on financial or administrative consid-
erations. The court held that the defendants failed to meet this
considerable burden of proof on several counts, including plain-
tiff's complaint of double-bunking.42
The Supreme Court's 1979 ruling in Bell v. Wolfish43 halted the
expansion of prisoners' rights. Writing for the Court, then-Justice
Rehnquist repudiated the premises embraced by the lower court.
First, rather than deference ending where rights began, deference
came into play in determining the scope of those rights.4 4 Second,
rather than detainees possessing all rights of free citizens absent a
35 See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971).
36 See, e.g., Newman, 559 F.2d at 289-90; Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956,
986-89 (D.R.I. 1977).
37 See supra notes 24-35 (citing cases),
38 439 F. Supp. 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd in part, revd in part sub nom. Wolfish v.
Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
39 Id. at 124.
40 Id.
41 Id. (quoting Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975)).
42 See id. at passim.
43 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
44 Id. at 546-49.
That the Court can uphold these indiscriminate searches highlights
the bankruptcy of its basic analysis. Under the test adopted today, the
rights of detainees apparently extend only so far as detention officials
decide that cost and security will permit. Such unthinking deference to
administrative convenience cannot be justified where the interests at
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compelling justification, the necessities of confinement precluded
certain rights and severely limited others.45 Accordingly, the Court
held that adverse conditions or restrictions pass constitutional mus-
ter under the Due Process Clause if they are "reasonably related to
a legitimate governmental objective. "46 Moreover, when applying
the test of reasonableness, "courts should ordinarily defer to"
prison staff s supposed expertise.4 7 The Court reversed the trial
court on all the primary issues.
48
A long-time litigator on behalf of inmates would later charac-
terize Wolfish as "the first emphatically general statement of the re-
quirement of deference to the expertise of prison officials,
regardless of whether they actually possess such expertise."4 9 And
the Wolfish Court certainly took its own advice. The facts of the
record mattered little, because a majority of the justices accepted at
face value the defendant's security concerns and accorded them
greater weight than the liberty interests of persons presumed
innocent.5"
For the next fourteen years, "the cry of Wofish"-the Court's
call for deference to the actions of prison officials 51-did not fully
resonate among the lower federal courts in large part because the
remedy, not the right, became the real keystone of prisoners'
rights.52 Comprehensive structural injunctions as well as equally
expansive consent decrees refashioned prison conditions in a man-
stake are those of presumptively innocent individuals, many of whose
only proven offense is the inability to afford bail.
Id. at 579 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 554.
Prison officials must be free to take appropriate action to ensure the
safety of inmates and corrections personnel and to prevent escape or
unauthorized entry. Accordingly, we have held that even when an insti-
tutional restriction infringes a specific constitutional guarantee, such as
the First Amendment, the practice must be evaluated in the light of the
central objective of prison administration, safeguarding institutional
security.
Id.
46 Id. at 539.
47 Id. at 543 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
48 Id. at 563.
49 Fred Cohen, The Limits ofJudicial Reform of Prisons: What Works, What Doesn't, 40
CRIM. L. BULL. 421, 440-41 (2004) (quotingJohn Boston); see also id. at 441 n.101 ("If
the poet laureate of New York were named a prison warden on January 1, he would be
a corrections expert in the Bell [v. Wolfish] mode the following morning.").
50 See id. at 441.
51 Ira P. Robbins, The Cty ofWolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal Judicial
Intervention in Prison Administration, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 212 (1980).
52 See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 638-39 (1982). "The remedial decree, rather
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ner once reserved for legislation.53 One amendment carried most
of the doctrinal weight. In the Eighth Amendment prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment, lower federal courts found the pro-
verbial "empty vessel."54 Two commentators were not fooled: Fee-
ley and Rubin, in their seminal study of the period, wrote, "Unless
there is additional content in the text [of the Eighth Amendment],
those decisions must be recognized as policy making, however
much the rule maker may try to characterize them as
interpretation.
55
C. Answering the "Cry of Wolfish"
One court that did not hear "the cry of Wolfish" was the district
court in Turner v. Safley, 56 which employed heightened scrutiny 7 in
finding unconstitutional prison regulations largely forbidding cor-
respondence between inmates and barring inmate marriages.58
The district court had deemed these activities to be fundamental
rights5 9-that is, "the very essence of a scheme of ordered lib-
than the finding of a constitutional violation, is commonly perceived as the key to the
success or the failure of the litigation." Id.
53 See, e.g., Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1298-302 (S.D. Tex. 1980), modified by
650 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), modified, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir.), affd in
part and rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (ordering system-wide relief in
Texas); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 1977) (ordering system-wide
relief in Alabama), rev'd in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per
curiam); Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F. Supp. 956, 986-89 (D.R.I. 1977) (ordering
system-wide relief in Puerto Rico), vacated, 599 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1979); Holt v. Sarver,
309 F. Supp. 362, 382-85 (E.D. Ark. 1970) (ordering system-wide relief in Arkansas),
affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
54 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDwARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 14 (1998).
55 Id. at 15.
56 Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd, 777 F.2d 1307 (8th
Cir. 1985), affd in part, revd in part, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
57 Heightened scrutiny applies to classifications employing suspect criteria. See,
e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (holding that legislation barring aliens
from practicing law violated equal protection); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971) (concluding that legislation restricting welfare benefits on the basis of
alienage violated equal protection); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964)
(holding that legislation barring the cohabitation of interracial unmarried couples
violated equal protection); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (ruling that
segregated schools violated equal protection). Compare Gerald Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (stating that heightened scrutiny
is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact"), with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in
theory, but fatal in fact."' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring))).
58 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 82-83.
59 Id. at 83 (noting that the district court "held the marriage regulation to be an
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erty"6-and thus barred limitations on their exercise unless they
constituted the least-restrictive method to achieving penal goals.61
The court of appeals affirmed using the same demanding test.62
Writing for the Supreme Court in Turner, Justice O'Connor
rejected application of the strict scrutiny test because she deemed
it incompatible with the Rehnquist Court's policy that judges
should not "become the primary arbiters of what constitutes the
best solution to every administrative problem."6 In place of
heightened scrutiny, the Turner Court advanced a reasonableness
standard consisting of the following prongs:
* Whether there is a "'valid, rational connection' between
the prison regulation and the legitimate [and neutral] gov-
ernmental interest put forward to justify it."64
* "[W]hether there are alternative means of exercising the
right [that is, the general constitutional right, such as free-
dom of expression, rather than a particular aspect-such
as corresponding through the mail,] that remain open to
prison inmates."65
* "[T]he impact accommodation of the asserted constitu-
tional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources generally."66
* "[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that
fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost
to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as
evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard."67
Four members of the Court-Justices Stevens, Marshall, Bren-
nan, and Blackmun-dissented. Speaking for the dissenters, Justice
Stevens characterized the test as "open-ended" and thus inviting
prison staff's speculative concerns to carry the day, every day.68 He
unconstitutional infringement upon the fundamental right to marry because it was far
more restrictive than was either reasonable or essential for the protection of the
State's interests in security and rehabilitation" (citing Safley, 586 F. Supp. at 594)).
60 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
61 Turner, 586 F. Supp at 594, 596.
62 Turner, 482 U.S. at 83-84.
63 Id. at 89.
64 Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
65 Id. at 90.
66 Id. ("When accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant 'ripple
effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential
to the informed discretion of corrections officials." (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners'
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132-33 (1977))).
67 Id. at 91.
68 Id. at 101 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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feared that wardens could invariably "produce [ ] ... [some] plausi-
ble security concern" to justify an exercise of power, including "the
use of bullwhips" to enforce prison rules.
69
III. THE IMPACT OF TURNERIZATION
Chief Justice Rehnquist and the other members of the Turner
majority envisaged a test governing all rights implicated by prison
regulations. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Turner Court, pos-
ited that "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitu-
tional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests."7 On the heels of the Turner rul-
ing, the Court applied the Turner test to prison regulations address-
ing two other aspects of the First Amendment: religious practices
in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz7' and receipt of books in Thornburgh v.
Abbott.72 In 2004, the Turner test would completely encircle the
First Amendment when the Court upheld limitations on freedom
of association in Overton v. Bazzetta.73
Meanwhile in Washington v. Harper,4 the Chief Justice voted
with the majority in applying the Turner test outside its original
First Amendment boundaries. The respondent had objected to a
policy allowing the involuntary use of psychotropic medication.
75
Even though the Court found that the policy implicated a due pro-
cess liberty interest, it nonetheless applied the Turner test in find-
ing that it reasonably advanced prison security.76 Regarding its
scope, the Court stated: "We made quite clear that the standard of
review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the
needs of prison administration implicate constitutional rights.
77
A. Boundary-Defining Criteria
During the long interval between Harper and the Court's 2005
decision in Johnson v. California,78 the Court expressed inconsistent
views regarding the reach of the Turner test. On the one hand in
69 Id. at 101.
70 Id. at 89 (majority opinion).
71 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987).
72 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989). The Roberts Court would embrace the Turner test to
determine the constitutionality of severe restrictions on published material for prison-
ers in long-term segregation in Beard v. Banks, 126 S. Ct. 2572 (2006).
73 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003).
74 494 U.S. 210, 224-25 (1991).
75 Id. at 214-15.
76 Id. at 225-26.
77 Id. at 224 (emphasis added) (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987)).
78 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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Shaw v. Murphy,79 the Court spoke of the Turner test as the "unitary,
deferential standard for reviewing prisoners' rights claims."8 ° On
the other hand, the Court did not apply the Turner test to prison
cases addressing the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
tion8" and the Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual
punishment.
82
Meanwhile, federal courts of appeals advanced three bound-
ary-defining approaches. One posited that the several prongs of
the Turner test applied to rights that involve "multi-faceted balanc-
ing."83 In articulating this criterion, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals used the Turner test to adjudicate a claim that cross-gender
searches violated male inmates' right to privacy.84 Cross-gender
searches, according to the federal panel, necessitated the balanc-
ing of prisoners' rights to privacy, equal employment rights of fe-
male officers, and the institution's interest in internal security.85
A second boundary-defining approach limited the Turner test
to situations involving day-to-day penal management. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia articulated this criterion by
ruling that the Turner test did not apply to a lawsuit bought by fe-
male federal prisoners who complained of unequal treatment be-
cause their male counterparts were housed closer to Washington,
D.C.86 The court observed that the proximity of the female prison
rested on policy decisions rather than day-to-day management.8 "
A third test, initially employed by the Ninth Circuit in Jordan v.
Gardner,88 posited that the Turner test "has been applied only where
79 532 U.S. 223 (2001).
80 Id. at 229.
81 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 48 (2002) (holding that an inmate's refusal to
make incriminating admissions in order to qualify for a sex abuse treatment program
did not result in adverse consequences sufficiently severe to constitute self-incrimina-
tion under the Fifth Amendment).
82 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843, 848 (1994) (applying the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment to inmate-on-inmate assault); Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (applying the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to
conditions of confinement).
83 See Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1099 n.8 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988)).
84 See id. at 1099-1101.
85 See id. at 1100.
86 Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1451-52 (D.C. Cir. 1989). Plaintiffs claimed
that "their being incarcerated far from the District" results "in the hardship of fewer
visitors (especially family members) and less preparation for and support in their
eventual return to the District than that afforded males imprisoned at the D.C. facili-
ties." Id. at 1452.
87 Id. at 1454.
88 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
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the constitutional right is one which is enjoyed by all persons, but
the exercise of which may necessarily be limited due to the unique
circumstances of imprisonment."89 The court held that the Turner
test did not determine what constitutes cruel and unusual punish-
ment because the Eighth Amendment prohibition of such punish-
ment does "not conflict with incarceration," but instead "limit[s]
the hardships which may be inflicted upon the incarcerated as
'punishment.' 90
In Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court delimited the Tur-
ner test to situations in which asserted rights are "'inconsistent with
proper incarceration.' 9 However, Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion failed to identify criteria for making this determination ex-
cept to posit that cruel and unusual punishment as well as racial
segregation fell outside the new standard because they were incom-
patible with "public respect for our system of justice."92 Justices
Thomas and Scalia, the lone dissenters, would likely have agreed
with a circuit judge's assessment in Gerber v. Hickman that "[t] he
repetition of... [the Johnson Court's] vague principle in numerous
ways, however, does not explain why. .. [a right] is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration." The editors of the Harvard Law
Review agreed: "[T] he Court has done little to assure that they will
be resolved in a predictable fashion. The key question that Johnson
passes over, and which underlies the doctrinal confusion it will cre-
ate, is why prisoners lose full constitutional protection at all."9 4
B. Charting the Constitutional Divide
1. Settled Territory
Prior to Johnson v. California, the Supreme Court had applied
the Turner test to challenges brought under the First Amendment
in Turner v. Safley,95 O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,96 Thornburgh v. Ab-
bott, 7 Shaw v. Murphy,9" and Overton v. Bazzetta;99 as well as prison-
89 Id. at 1530 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1990)).
90 Id. (citing Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193-94 (9th Cir. 1979)).
91 543 U.S. 499, 510 (2005) (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131
(2003)).
92 Id. at 511 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986)).
93 Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 2002) (TashimaJ., dissenting)
(en banc), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002).
94 The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, 119 Hnv. L. REv. 228, 235 (2005).
95 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
96 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (holding that institutional regulations restricting the
exercise of religion are reasonably related to institutional goals).
97 490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (holding that institutional regulations restricting pub-
lications are reasonably related to institutional goals).
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ers' right to privacy in Washington v. Harper100 Lower federal
courts extended the reach of Turner to the prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment;... the ban on unreasonable searches;'0 2 de-
nial of equal protection of the law because of race,'0° gender,' °4
and religious affiliation;'0 5  as well as matters of statutory
interpretation.'06
The Court's decision in Johnson gave no indication that the
constitutional territory it had previously staked out for the Turner
test, as delineated above, would be lost to a different test. Indeed,
the Court explicitly spoke of only two rights-the prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishment and racial discrimination-that lay
beyond the reach of the Turner test.17 Subsequently, lower federal
courts have been true to this reading of Johnson. For example, the
district court in Roe v. Crawford' rejected the plaintiffs assertion
that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in prison is com-
parable to the right to be free of racial segregation and therefore is
"not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of
proper prison administration."'0 9 The court asserted that Johnson
intended "many rights," including reproductive freedom, to fall
under the Turner test." 0
2. Contested Territory
Commencing shortly after the Court's ruling in Turner v.
Safley, lower federal courts have extended the Turner test into areas
not yet staked out by the Supreme Court. Although Johnson v. Cali-
fornia categorically barred the lower federal courts from applying
Turner test to the Eighth Amendment and to race-based equal pro-
tection challenges, it failed to address definitively the importation
98 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001) (holding that inmates lack a First Amendment right to
assist other inmates in legal matters).
99 539 U.S. 126, 127 (2003) (barring visitation with children when the inmate's
parental rights have been terminated).
100 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1991) (allowing the involuntary use of psychotropic
medication).
101 Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 2000).
102 Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001).
103 White v. Morris, 832 F. Supp. 1129, 1137 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
104 Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Turnerto an
equal protection claim).
105 Salaam v. Collins, 830 F. Supp. 853, 861 (D. Md. 1993).
106 Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994).
107 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 511-12 (2005).
108 439 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
109 Id. at 948 (citing Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510).
110 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Johnson, 543 U.S. at 510).
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of the Turner test by lower federal courts into the subject areas ex-
amined below.
a. Equal Protection
Albeit still limited, post-Johnson caselaw supports application of
the Turner test to equal protection challenges not based on race.
As the court in Tolbert v. McGrath"' concluded:
For distinctions drawn among prisoners other than those based
on race, strict scrutiny is inappropriate to test the infringement
of prisoners' constitutional rights. Where a prison regulation
(other than a race-based one) impinges on inmates' constitu-
tional rights, the regulation or practice is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests."
12
Moreover, lower federal and state courts have ruled that dispa-
rate treatment of persons of color that can be attributed to some
factor other than race or ethnicity should be adjudicated by the
Turner test. 13 For instance, in Meggett v. Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections,"4 a state court applied the Turner test to a prison regu-
lation that treated Afro haircuts differently than other haircuts." 5
The court reasoned that Afro haircuts were race-neutral because
they could be worn by white people." 6 The court ultimately ruled
in favor of the defendant.
17
In turn, Johnson does not contravene earlier case law that ap-
plied the Turner test to claims of religious discrimination." 8 For
instance, Salaam v. Collins'19 addressed whether staff had discrimi-
nated against Muslim inmates in denying them ritually slaughtered
meat.121 By contrast, prison officials had honored Jewish inmates'
desire for kosher meals. 12' The court in Salaam applied the highly
''1 No. 04-3039 (SI), 2005 WL 3310065 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2005).
112 Id. at *6 (citations omitted).
113 See, e.g., McClain v. Rogers 155 F. App'x 918, 921 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing
a white supremacist's claim as religion-based given his affiliation with a white suprem-
acist religion); Meggett v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 892 A.2d 872 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006)
(rejecting claim that restrictions on Afro haircuts was racially based). Because the
disparate treatment affecting a black inmate in McGrath arose due to his attendance at
Muslim religious services, the court used the Turner test and, not surprisingly, ruled
against the plaintiff. McGrath, 2005 WL 3310065, at *6.
114 Meggett, 892 A.2d 872.
115 Id. at 883-84.
116 Id. at 888.
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1990); Salaam v.
Collins, 830 F. Supp. 853, 855-56 (D. Md. 1993).
119 830 F. Supp. 853.
120 Id. at 854-55.
121 Id. at 860.
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deferential Turner test in ruling that financial considerations justi-
fied the unequal treatment of Muslim inmates: Their dietary de-
mands, unlike those of the Jewish inmates, would impose more
than de minimis costs.
1 2 2
By placing discrimination based on race alone outside the
reach of the Turner test, Johnson invites lower federal courts to re-
consider their earlier case law on sex discrimination in prison.
Shortly after the ruling in Turner, however, the D.C. Circuit in Pitts
v. Thornburgh123 rejected defendant prison officials' contention
that the Turner test governed alleged sexual discrimination in the
housing of inmates,124 advancing three reasons for not doing so.
First, Turner addressed "the day-to-day operations of prisons that
restrict the exercise of prisoners' individual rights," whereas the
facts of the instant case concerned where to locate a women's
prison, which the court characterized as a nonjudiciable policy de-
cision. 125 Second, unlike the facts of Turner, the instant case al-
leged gender discrimination, "a classification that traditionally
summons heightened scrutiny. 1 26 Finally, the right to equal pro-
tection is different from other individual rights in that it implicates
the ill-will of government and thus an improper governmental
motive. 121
Citing the Pitts case, the Eighth Circuit in Pargo v. Eliott 28 ob-
served that Turner does not foreclose all heightened judicial re-
view. 1 29  Female inmates imprisoned in Iowa complained of
programs inferior to their male counterparts.1 30 Employing the
Turner test, the district court ruled against them. 1 ' The circuit
court vacated and remanded the trial court judgment;3 2 moreo-
ver, the court implied that Turner's deferential standard should not
be applied because the women's suit did not address a matter of
internal prison security.'
33
Earlier, the Eighth Circuit in Klinger v. Department of Correc-
122 Id. at 861.
123 866 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
124 Id. at 1453-55.
125 Id. at 1453.
126 Id. at 1554.
127 Id. at 1555.
128 49 F.3d 1355 (8th Cir. 1995).
129 Id. at 1357.
130 Id. at 1355-56.
131 Pargo v. Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (S.D. Iowa. 1994), vacated, 49 F.3d 1355
(8th Cir. 1995).
132 Id. at 1357.
133 Id. at 1357. The case was dismissed by the district court on remand. Pargo v.
Elliott, 894 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Iowa), affd, 69 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 1995).
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tions'34 had addressed an alleged denial of equal protection arising
from dissimilar programs available to female and male inmates
confined in Nebraska. 35 Unlike the aforementioned Pargo wo-
men, these female inmates blamed the inequality on prison staff's
allocation of resources. 36 Consequently, the Klinger court charac-
terized the Nebraska women's claim as one addressing the "day-to-
day administrative decisions of prison officials" and thus concluded




Johnson leaves undisturbed those lower federal court rulings
that applied the Turner test to inmate lawsuits over restrictions on
statutory rights. In Gates v. Rowland,139 the court addressed a statu-
tory claim by HIV-positive inmates. Prison staff had barred them
from food service jobs, purportedly in violation of federal law for-
bidding disability discrimination. 140 The court concluded that the
rights created by the statute could be limited by prison authorities
if reasonably related to penal objectives.' 41 Application of the Tur-
ner test in this manner rested on statutory intent, so found the
court:
There is no indication that Congress intended the Act to apply
to prison facilities irrespective of... effective prison administra-
tion.... Thus, we deem the applicable standard for the review
of the Act's statutory rights in the prison setting to be equivalent
to the review of constitutional rights in a prison setting as out-
lined by the Supreme Court in Turner .... "
14 2
The Ninth Circuit then deferred to defendants' explanation for
excluding the HIV-positive inmates from serving food to the main-
line population. The defendants asserted that they had catered to
inmates' "think[ing] the worst-that ... [HIV-positive food serv-
ers] will bleed into the food, spit into the food, or even worse." '1 43
This, the defendants argued, could lead to "violent actions" against
134 31 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 1994).
135 Id. at 729.
136 Id. at 731.
137 Id. at 732.
138 Id. at 734.
139 39 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994).
140 Id. at 1445.
141 Id. at 1447.
142 Id.
143 Id.
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HIV-positive food servers.144
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits appear disposed to following
the Ninth Circuit's lead on this issue. In Torcasio v. Murray,14 5 the
Fourth Circuit addressed an action brought under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff-inmate asserted that staff
had failed to make necessary accommodations under the ADA by
refusing to modify his cell, the prison lobby, and recreation ar-
eas.14 6 On appeal, the circuit court granted the defendants quali-
fied immunity because they could have reasonably believed that
Turner permitted them to place penal objectives ahead of the in-
mate's statutory right to reasonable accommodations. 147 Quoting
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gates, the Fourth Circuit panel rea-
soned, "It is highly doubtful that Congress intended a more strin-
gent application of prisoners' statutory rights created by the Act
than it would the prisoners' constitutional rights."14
In the Seventh Circuit decision of Love v. Westville Correctional
Center,149 a quadriplegic inmate brought suit under the ADA. He
asserted that his disability prevented his use of numerous programs
available to other inmates, as well as the recreational, dining, and
visiting facilities.15 ° Rather than asserting that the Turner test over-
rode statutory rights per se, the court stated, "It is entirely possible"
that the Act's "reasonableness requirement must be judged in light
of the overall institutional requirements." '151 This could dictate
that "no reasonable accommodations were possible. 15 2 Because the
defendant did not explain why it failed to accommodate the plain-
tiff, the court affirmed the jury award of damages.1 53
The district court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin stands
alone in expressly rejecting Turner's applicability to federal stat-
utes. In Lewis v. Sullivan,154 the court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a key provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)
barring in forma pauperis suits. The defendants argued in part that
the Turner test applied to federal statutes, which would require the
144 Id. at 1447-48.
145 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995).
146 Id. at 1342.
147 Id. at 1355.
148 Id. (quoting Gates, 39 F.3d at 1447).
149 103 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 1996).
150 Id. at 559-60.
151 Id. at 561.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 135 F. Supp. 2d 954 (W.D. Wis. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 279 F.3d 526 (7th
Cir. 2002).
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trial court to uphold the challenged provision of the PLRA as long
as it promoted a reasonable penal objective-regardless of whether
it otherwise violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. 55 District
Judge Crabb disagreed, finding that the justification for deferring
to prison regulations, per Turner, did not apply to federal stat-
utes. 1513 She explained that prison regulations, unlike statutes, "are
enacted and implemented by persons in the business of running
prisons," who would be impeded in "the efficient operation of pris-
ons" if constrained by constitutional rights.
157
c. Privacy, Including Searches
In his dissenting opinion in Jordan v. Gardner,158 Chief Judge
Wallace of the Ninth Circuit asserted that Turner subsumed Bell v.
Wolfish in Fourth Amendment cases. 159 When the Wolfish Court
invoked a reasonableness test, it characterized its inner workings as
balancing "the scope of the particular intrusion; the manner in
which it was conducted; the justification for initiating it; and the
place in which it is conducted." 6 ' But Chief Judge Wallace's dis-
sent posited that "Turner does not authorize such balancing."'
6'
Unlike Wolfish, he explained, "What Turner does not require or per-
mit is for ajudge to look at the injury to inmates, on the one hand,
and the benefit to prison administration, on the other, and say this
one or that one is more important ....", He could have added
that Turner dictates penal interests are presumed much weightier,
placing a considerable burden on plaintiff-inmates to overcome
this presumption. Hence, factual situations that balance in favor of
the plaintiff-inmates under the Wolfish test could be reversed under
the more deferential Turner test.
The pre-Johnson caselaw on this issue lacked consensus. 6 ' The
Second Circuit presumably would use the Wolfish test for pretrial
detainees given its conclusion that Turner exclusively addresses
155 See id. at 968.
156 See id.
157 Id. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).
158 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
159 Id. at 1567 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
160 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979).
161 Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1567 (Wallace, C.J., dissenting).
162 Id.
163 See Foote v. Spiegle, 995 F. Supp. 1347, 1349 n.2 (D. Utah 1998) (indicating
"some uncertainty among the lower federal courts as to the proper relationship be-
tween the Bell factors and the Turner factors in Fourth Amendment cases").
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prisons rather than jails.' 6 4 The Third Circuit applied the Turner
test to inmates' right of privacy in medical information' 65 and to
non-therapeutic abortions.1 66 Inmates possess "at best" a minimal
right to privacy, wrote the Fifth Circuit in upholding cross-gender
searches using Turner's reasonableness standard. t6 7 The Eighth
Circuit applied the Turner test in permitting surveillance of men's
showers by female officers. 161 Its brethren on the Ninth Circuit
stated that they would use those parts of the Turner test they
deemed applicable to the Fourth Amendment.1 69 In a later ruling,
the Tenth Circuit embraced Wolfish's balancing test in evaluating
strip searches but indicated that Turner's concern with penal aims
would be pertinent in deciding the appropriateness of the search's
location. v° Lastly, an Eleventh Circuit panel indicated that it
would rely exclusively on all four prongs of the Turner test in deter-
mining limitations on the right to bodily privacy.'
71
The sparse post-Johnson caselaw favors the application of the
Turner test when prison regulations limit the most fundamental of
privacy rights-a female inmate's desire to terminate her preg-
nancy. At issue in Roe v. Crawford172 was a Missouri prison regula-
tion that provided transportation for an off-site abortion only to
safeguard the mother's health.173 In finding that the Turner test
governed the regulation's constitutionality, the court held that the
right to an abortion is "inconsistent with proper incarceration.
d. Pretrial Detention
A line of lower federal court cases indicates that Turner does
not subsume Wolfish for alleged inflictions of pretrial punish-
164 See Shain v. Ellison, 273 F.3d 56, 66 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001); Benjamin v. Fraser, 264
F.3d 175, 187 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001).
165 Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001).
166 Monmouth County Corr. Inst. v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 338-44 (3d Cir. 1987).
167 Sinclair v. Stalder, 78 Fed. App'x 987, 989 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Ferrell v.
Bowles, 91 Fed. App'x 949, 950 (5th Cir. 2004).
168 Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1101 (8th Cir. 1990).
169 See Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 331 (9th Cir. 1988). The court found
Turners second prong to be "much more meaningful in the First Amendment context
than the Fourth or Eighth, where the right is to be free from a particular wrong." Id.
at 331 n.1.
170 Farmer v. Perrill, 288 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2002).
171 Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993).
172 439 F. Supp. 2d 942 (W.D. Mo. 2006).
173 Id. at 946.
174 Id. at 947.
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ment. 175 They have stressed that Wolfish's delineation of the goals
of pretrial detention differ from Turner's focus on "penological
objectives." As the Second Circuit explained:
Penological interests are interests that relate to the treatment
(including punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, etc... ) of
persons convicted of crimes. Although some of the concerns of
pretrial detention, especially protection against further criminal
conduct, overlap with the concerns of penology, there are im-
portant differences. Penological interests are therefore argua-
bly not an appropriate guide for the pretrial detention of
accused persons.
1 76
On the. other hand, some circuits utilize the Turner test to ad-
dress claims by pretrial detainees. The Ninth Circuit has embraced
the Turner test when pretrial detainees assert violations of the First
Amendment. 177 The Fourth Circuit has employed the four prongs
of the Turner test when disabilities imposed on detainees allegedly
arise from security concerns, 178 including those born of the fact-
specific circumstances found in Wolfish.'19 Lastly, the Sixth Circuit
in Martucci v. Johnson 8 ° applied both tests: It first held that, under
the Wolfish test, a detainee's segregation did not inflict punish-
ment 8 1 and then used the Turner test in rejecting his First Amend-
ment claims arising from jailers withholding his mail. 182
IV. THE UNDERPINNINGS OF TURNERIZATION
The broad reach of Turnerization is matched by what Law-
rence Sager would have called its "thinness"-that is, its capacity to
underenforce the Constitution.' 83 The underpinnings of Turner-
ization, which are examined below, have circumscribed the poten-
tially broad sweep of prisoners' rights. 84  For inmates, the
consequences of underenforcement are profound. As in the previ-
175 See, e.g., Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004); Benjamin v. Fraser,
264 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (en banc).
176 Benjamin, 264 F.3d at 187 n.10 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (citing Mauro v.
Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.2, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999) (alteration in original)).
177 Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
178 See Hause v. Vaught, 993 F.2d 1079, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993).
179 See id. (applying the Turner test to the "publishers-only rule," which requires that
all inmate publications come directly from the publisher and which the Wolfish Court
upheld as a reasonable security measure).
180 944 F.2d 291 (6th Cir. 1991).
181 Id. at 293-94.
182 Id. at 296.
183 Lawrence G. Sager, Thin Constitutions and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAm L. Rv.
1989, 1989 (2001).
184 But cf Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ("A prisoner retains
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ously discussed Kimberlin v. United States Department of Justice,8 5 in
which the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals discarded "facts" in up-
holding a mean-spirited policy forbidding electric and electronic
musical instruments,1 8 6 underenforcement has created a moral
shortfall by compromising constitutional norms in exchange for
penal objectives of trifling worth.'1
7
A. Judicial Minimalism
"All the Justices on the contemporary Rehnquist Court, other
than the originalists [i.e., Justices Scalia and Thomas] . . . engage
in judicial minimalism," contends Ronald Kahn.1"' Judicial
minimalism possesses two dimensions: narrowness and shallowness.
A decision is narrow when it decides the case at hand and nothing
more."8 A decision achieves shallowness when it provides a defini-
tive judgment free of abstractions.19 °
The Rehnquist Court's application of the Turner test bears a
close resemblance to judicial minimalism, a form of judicial deci-
sionmaking that "settles the case before it, but leaves many things
undecided."19 ' Take, for instance, the Supreme Court's ruling in
Overton v. Bazzetta.192 A burgeoning prison population led the
Michigan Department of Corrections to limit the number of mi-
nors eligible to visit prisoners unless the minor is visiting an impris-
oned parent and other kin.'93 Some of the rules in question
barred children of inmates whose parental rights had been termi-
nated and required juvenile visitors to be accompanied by a parent
or legal guardian.' 94 The Supreme Court ruled that the regula-
tions satisfied each of the four parts of the Turner test.' 95
Economy of analysis characterized Justice Kennedy's majority
all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implica-
tion, taken from him by law.").
185 318 F.3d 228 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
186 Id. at 233.
187 Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1212, 1213 (1978).
188 Ronald Kahn, The Canon of Constitutional Law for Undergraduate Teaching: The
Melding of Constitutional Theory, Law, and Interpretive/Empirical Political Science, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 399, 408 (2000).
189 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 10 (1999).
190 Id. at 13.
191 Id.
192 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
193 Id. at 129.
194 Id. at 129-30.
195 Id. at 133-36.
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opinion. His "bottom line" read as follows: "[T]o reduce the num-
ber of child visitors, a line must be drawn," and the one drawn by
prison officials would do.'16 The Court achieved "narrowness" by
upholding the constitutionality of the visitation restrictions without
deciding whether inmates possessed a right to contact visits.' 9 7 Jus-
tice Kennedy's majority opinion also obtained "shallowness" by
skirting any discussion of how one determines whether an asserted
right is "inconsistent with proper incarceration."198
The minimalism of the Turner test accommodates and implic-
itly legitimates the "countermajoritarian difficulty."' 99 This is the
notion that the powers of the Supreme Court, especially its author-
ity to find legislation unconstitutional, improperly conflict with ma-
jority rule.2 0 Alexander Bickel famously coined the phrase
"countermajoritarian difficulty"20' before the demise of the hands-
off doctrine and thus never discussed its relationship to prisoners'
rights. However, for H.N. Hirsh and other commentators, "coun-
termajoritarian" is exactly what "[American] constitutionalism is
meant to be. 20 2 The Framers surely feared what Justice Brandeis
called the "tyrannies of governing majorities.
2 3
If one acknowledges the "countermajoritarian difficulty," a ca-
veat arises under United States v. Carolene Products.20 4 Its much-dis-
cussed footnote four provides for "more searching" or "more
exacting" judicial scrutiny of government actions directed against
"discrete and insular minorities."20 5 Erwin Chemerinsky contends
196 Id. at 133.
197 The Court denied that it was precluding a right to "intimate association" and
proceeded to state that it "need not attempt to explore or define the asserted right of
association." Id. at 131-32.
198 Id. at 131 ("The very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liber-
ties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An
inmate does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.").
199 ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1978).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 H.N. HIRSCH, A THEORY OF LIBERTY 5 (1992); see also Whitney v. California 274
U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring) (arguing thatjudicial review existed to
prevent "the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities"); Julian N. Eule, Judicial
Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522 (1990) ("If the Constitution's Fram-
ers were keen on majority rule, they certainly had a bizarre manner of demonstrating
their affection.").
203 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see
also THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 129-30 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
1961) (observing that "measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of
Justice and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested
and over-bearing majority").
204 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
205 See, e.g., LIEF H. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING 86 (1985)
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that inmates ought to be regarded as one of those groups.20 6 In-
deed, several other commentators describe inmates as "a despised
minority without political power, '20 7 "the untouchable class of
American society, 12 0 8 and "the least sympathetic group of 'outsid-
ers' in our constitutional jurisprudence. '20 9  Moreover, inmates
bring to prison other disadvantaging qualities: They are largely un-
dereducated 21° and impoverished, 211 and they disproportionately
experience mental illness.
21 2
("[Footnote four is] the most commonly cited justification for ... active [judicial]
protection of civil rights and liberties."); Lewis F. Powell,Jr., Carolene Products Revisited,
82 COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1982) ("[M]iany scholars think [footnote four] actually
commenced a new era in constitutional law."); Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory
Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 115
n.25 (1983) ("The famous . . . footnote four first suggests that the normal presump-
tion of constitutionality may not operate in cases involving certain distinctions.").
Footnote four provides:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a spe-
cific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be em-
braced within the Fourteenth [Amendment].
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exact-
ing judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment ....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the
review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial
minorities. [W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry.
Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
206 Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 441, 459 (1999) ("Those in the military, in prisons, and in schools are classic
discrete and insular minorities, who have little political power.").
207 CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 289 (1993)
("Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a despised minority without political
power to influence the policies of legislative and executive officials.").
208 George P. Fletcher, Disenftanchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses
of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1898 (1999).
209 Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province ofJudging: Justice Blackmun
and the Outsiders, 71 N.D. L. REv. 173, 176 (1995).
210 SeeJames E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A
"Not Exactly," Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 133 (2000) ("Fifty
percent left school before the eleventh grade. Three of every four inmates cannot
read above an eighth grade level and as many as half may be functionally illiterate.").
211 SeeJEFFREY REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON 135 (5th
ed. 1998). Some 50% of inmates free for a year or more before their arrest reported
incomes under $10,000; 19% reported incomes less than $3000. Id.
212 See James R.P. Ogloff et al., Mental Health Services in Jails and Prisons: Legal,
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B. Faux Balancing
Prisoners' rights came of age in a constitutional era domi-
nated by "balancing. '213 In its purest form, balancing as a mode of
constitutional interpretation identifies threatened constitutional
rights and assigns weight to those rights to determine if their im-
portance exceeds that of the intruding governmental interests.
The four-prong Turner test deceptively suggests balancing, particu-
larly with regard to all but the first prong: If the court finds that the
first-prong is satisfied-the presence of a valid, rational connection
between the prison regulation and the legitimate and neutral gov-
ernmental interest put forward to justify it, the court then consid-
ers the remaining prongs and balances the findings.2 14
In practice, the Turner test operates as a multi-factor test. "Tur-
ner does not authorize a balancing test," wrote the chief judge of
the Ninth Circuit.215 Unlike Bell v. Wolfish, he explained, "Turner
does not require or permit . . .a judge to look at the injury to
inmates, on the one hand, and the benefit to prison administra-
tion, on the other, and say this one or that one is more important
"216
Moreover, the several prongs have a distinct "tilt." "[W] hat is
striking about the Court's application of the Turner test," writes one
commentator, "is the way in which the Turner factors are crafted
(or, critics might contend, contrived) to generally foreordain a
finding against a prisoner's constitutional claim." '217 The first
prong's commitment to rationality, the sine qua non of the test,
2 18
has a clear subtext: Reasonable means of achieving goals, including
petty goals, trump rights. Indeed, penal goals acquire the status of
Clinical, and Policy Issues, 18 LAW & PYSCHOL. REv. 109, 109 (1994) (finding that seri-
ous mental illness afflicts 6.5%-10% of prisoners, with moderate mental illness found
amongst an additional 15%-40%).
213 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE LJ. 943, 946 (1987) (discussing the popularity of balancing).
214 See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
215 Jordan v. Gardener, 986 F.2d 1521, 1567 (9th Cir. 1993) (Wallace, C.J.,
dissenting).
216 Id.
217 Lynn S. Branham, "Go and Sin No More:" The Constitutionality of Governmentally
Funded Faith-Based Prison Units, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 297 (2004).
218 See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229-30 (2001) ("If the connection be-
tween the regulation and the asserted goal is 'arbitrary or irrational,' then the regula-
tion fails, irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.") (quoting Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)); Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151
(9th Cir. 2001) (describing the first prong as the "sine qua non"); Walker v. Sumner,
917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that the "first of these factors consti-
tutes a sine qua non").
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categorical imperatives, occupying a higher constitutional plane
than rights. Moreover, the first prong functions as the leveler of
rights by drawing no distinction between "weak" (non-fundamen-
tal) and "strong" (fundamental) rights. Similarly, this prong ig-
nores the vulnerability of inmates as powerless outcasts to
government overreaching.21 9
To make matters worse for plaintiffs, the remaining three
prongs are conceptually aligned in favor of defendant prison offi-
cials. As one court observed, "the first [prong] 'looms especially
large' because it 'tends to encompass the remaining [prongs].' "220
Because of their overlapping features, the prongs operate like
dominoes: Once the first and most weighty prong falls, the others
do as well. A commentator elaborates:
For example, if a court finds under the first prong that there is a
valid connection between a regulation and a legitimate govern-
mental purpose, then it will naturally conclude under prong
three that the exerted right would have an impact on prison
staff. This makes perfect sense. If there is a legitimate reason
for enacting the regulation, it must be to prevent some deleteri-
ous effect within the prison. And, once a court finds that the
regulation is rationally related to a penological purpose and that
it furthers prison security, the court will likely define the pris-
oner's right broadly in order to find, under the second prong,
that there are other means available for exercising the right.
Similarly, under prong four, a court will be less inclined to find
that the regulation represents an exaggerated response, or that
the state has alternative means of dealing with the problem at
hand.221
C. Deference
As illustrated by the Court's embrace of challenged restric-
tions on child visitation in Overton v. Bazzetta,222 the Turner test also
rested upon a third element: due deference to the judgments of
prison staff. Indeed, the Court in Overton assumed the truthfulness
of the prison officials' concerns about visitation by minors despite
219 See supra note 207 and accompanying text (asserting that inmates ought to be
regarded as a powerless class).
220 Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Amatel v.
Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
221 William Mark Roth, Turner v. Safley: The Supreme Court Further Confuses Prisoners'
Constitutional Rights, 22 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 667, 696 (1989).
222 539 U.S. 126 (2003); see also supra text accompanying notes 193-94 (describing
the challenged visitation rules).
[Vol. 10:97120
2006] THE "TURNERIZATION" OF PRISONERS' RIGHTS 121
empirical evidence to the contrary. 223  Whereas prison staff
claimed that visiting children created disturbances, not one docu-
mented incident occurred.2 2 4 Moreover, one study found that
"[t]he presence of children makes prisons easier, not harder, to
manage, and that lawsuits have not been a problem. ' 225 Similarly,
the defendants' proposition that child visitors would become "too
comfortable" with prison life and thus less likely to be deterred
from criminal acts2 2 6 is refuted by studies showing that children
separated from an incarcerated parent suffer considerable psycho-
logical harm and become likely candidates for criminality.
227
The Rehnquist Court's strong commitment to deference
228
arose from its affinity to the majoritarian constitutional para-
digm. 229 Born from the Lochner era, which spanned from 1897 to
1939 and saw the Supreme Court invalidate economic and social
welfare legislation in the name of freedom to contract,230 this para-
digm posits that actions taken by the majoritarian branches of gov-
ernment should prevail even when there exists "reasonable
disagreement" over their constitutionality. 23' In turn, by applying
Turner's rational-basis test to prison rules and policies, the Court
has sought to restrain itself, and especially the lower federal courts,
from interfering with the executive branch's management of pris-
ons. "Prison administration," stated the Turner Court, "is... a task
that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches,
and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial
223 Overton, 539 U.S. at 133.
224 See Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d 813, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2001), affd, 286
F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
225 Kelsey Kauffman, Mothers in Prison, CORREC-rONS TODAY, Feb. 2001, at 65.
226 Bazzetta, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 824.
227 Barbara Bloom, Children of Prisoners, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 75
(Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams III eds., 1996). Imprisoned mothers also
benefit from visits with their children. Mary Martin, Connected Mothers: A Follow-Up
Study of Incarcerated Women and Their Children, 8(4) WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 1, 18-19
(1997) (finding a strong relationship between the post-prison success of imprisoned
mothers who visited most frequently with their children while incarcerated in the
Minnesota Correctional Facility at Shakopee).
228 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Foreword: Implementing
the Constitution, 111 I-IARv. L. REv. 54, 79 (1997) ("U]udicial scrutiny under rational
basis review is typically so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber stamp.").
229 Id. at 141-42.
230 In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court found "a general right.., to con-
tract." 198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905). Lochners offspring read laissez faire values into the
Constitution. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 554 (1923) (ruling
that minimum wage laws violated due process); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 25-26
(1915) (striking down legislation prohibiting "yellow dog" contracts).
231 Fallon, supra note 228, at 75-77.
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restraint. 232
The Court has also expressly linked deference to the myth that
prison staff possesses unique and extraordinary skills. "Running a
prison," asserted Justice O'Connor in Turner, "is an inordinately
difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the
commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the
province of the legislative and executive branches of govern-
ment."233 In applying the Turner test to censorship of books bound
for prison, the Court went so far as to characterize the supervision
of inmates as subject to "Herculean obstacles.1
23 4
This perspective is disconnected from the contaminated real-
ity of incarceration. As evidenced by Zimbardo's famous mock
prison experiment of 1971, the prison environment transforms
prison officers for the worse.235 The abuses visited upon his volun-
teer student-inmates by student-guards led Zimbardo to conclude
that at the very least a "mean spirited value system" may be inher-
ent in the prison officer subculture.236
The Rehnquist Court would have benefited from Owen's study
of the evolving behavior of prison guards at San Quentin Prison.
23 7
Whereas new officers begin their careers by "going by the
book"Z3 -an approach that approximates a legalistic style that the
Supreme Court presumes to be the norm-they soon discern gaps
between official policy and look elsewhere to make sense of the
complicated prison culture. 239 To address the inadequacy of "go-
ing by the book," guards enter a second occupational style-be-
coming "badge heavy," "super cops" 24 0 who rely on force and its
threatened use. Many guards progress to a third stage, "the old-
timer phase," which is based on a kind of "common sense" that has
little to do with legality and likely justifies illegal uses of force.241
Nor did the Rehnquist Court grasp the notion that prison
guards' shared occupational experiences give rise to an officer sub-
232 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987).
233 Id. at 84-85.
234 Thornburgh v. Abbot, 490 U.S. 401, 428 (1989).
235 Philip G. Zimbardo et al., Reflections on the Stanford Prison Experiment: Genesis,
Transformations, Consequences, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON
THE MILGRAM PARADIGM 193, 208 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000).
236 Id. at 210.
237 BARBARA A. OWEN, THE REPRODUCTION OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1988) (studying the
attitudes and behavior of prison workers at San Quentin prison).
238 Id. at 87.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 88.
241 Id. at 90.
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culture that further undermines legality. John Irwin, a former in-
mate turned criminologist, observed that guards as well as prison
administrators perceive inmates as "worthless, untrustworthy, ma-
nipulative, and disreputable deviants. "242 James Marguart identi-
fied an officer code legitimating illegal beatings as means of order
maintenance.243 Kelsey Kauffman's interviews with correctional of-
ficers revealed widespread unlawful guard violence directed at
inmates.244
V. CONCLUSION
No jailhouse lawyer would have long mourned the death of
Chief Justice Rehnquist. His tenure as Chief Justice could be cap-
tured in one decision handed down shortly after his elevation: Tur-
ner v. Safley. Surely Turner remains the most influential of all
prisoners' rights cases. Addressing freedom of correspondence, a
preferred right given heightened scrutiny by the Turner trial
court,245 the Court applied its most deferential test. The Supreme
Court, as well as the lower federal courts, quickly extended the Tur-
ner test to a host of other prisoners' rights. That Turner has worked
a sea change was confirmed when the Ninth Circuit, reputed to be
the nation's most liberal circuit,246 applied this standard in ruling
that the racial segregation of inmates at reception centers was con-
stitutionally acceptable. 247 And while the Supreme Court in John-
son v. California retreated from its earlier language describing the
Turner test as the "unitary, deferential standard for reviewing pris-
oners' rights claims, ' 248 a wide swath of constitutional territory re-
mains subject to it.
2 49
242 JOHN IRWIN, THE WAREHOUSE PRISON 64 (2005). That this mindset can afflict
prison administrators finds anecdotal support in the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu
Ghraib. Leah Caldwell, The Masterminds of Torture, Humiliation and Abuse: From
Supermax to Abu Ghraib, COUNTERPUNCH, Oct. 15, 2004, http://www.counterpunch.
org/caldwell101 52004.html.
243 SeeJames W. Marquart, Prison Guards and the Use of Physical Coercion As a Mecha-
nism of Prisoner Control, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 347 (1986) (describing guard violence as
"highly structured and deeply entrenched in the guard subculture").
244 See KELSEY KAUFFMAN, PRISON OFFICERS AND THEIR WORLD 130 (1988) (finding
that the majority of the interviewed guards reported seeing illegal force against
inmates).
245 Safley v. Turner, 586 F. Supp. 589, 595 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd, 777 F.2d 1307
(8th Cir. 1985), affd in part and rev'd in part, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
246 SeeJerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the
Country-Fact or Fiction , 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1471 (1997).
247 Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499
(2005).
248 Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001).
249 See supra Part III.B.
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The federal judiciary's embrace of the Turner test reveals a
"normative strain" in the bureaucratic state. On the one hand,
through its broad reach and exceptional deference, Turnerization
precludes effective judicial opposition to the dominant penal ideol-
ogy-the new penology. In contrast to the rehabilitative ideal,
which sought to reintegrate offenders into the broader commu-
nity,250 the new penology regards prisoners as disposable social
junk251 and is dedicated to managing them as a permanent
subgroup.252
On the other hand, Turnerization conflicts with the grund-
norm of prisoners' constitutional rights-equal concern and re-
spect. This grundnorm originates in the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. For George Fletcher, the Equal
Protection Clause represents the "second American [C]onstitu-
tion. ' ' 2 5 ' Born of the Civil War, this Constitution advances the re-
publican ideals of "organic nationhood, equality of all persons, and
250 Francis Allen coined the term "rehabilitative ideal":
The rehabilitative ideal is itself a complex of ideas .... It is assumed,
first, that human behavior is the product of antecedent causes. These
causes can be identified as part of the physical universe, and it is the
obligation of the scientist to discover and to describe them with all pos-
sible exactitude. Knowledge of the antecedents of human behavior
makes possible an approach to the scientific control of human behavior.
Finally.... it is assumed that measures employed to treat the convicted
offender should serve a therapeutic function, that such measures
should be designed to effect changes in the behavior of the convicted
person in the interests of his own happiness, health, and satisfaction
and in the interest of social defense.
Francis A. Allen, CriminalJustice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 226, 226 (1959).
251 SeeJames E. Robertson, The Majority Opinion as the Social Construction of Reality, 53
OKLA. L. REv. 161, 190 (2000) (footnotes omitted):
Beneath the sanitized exterior of the new penology lies a correctional
system that manages the underclass-the social junk of advanced capi-
talism. . . . [T]his lumpenproletariate occupying the inner city [has
long been targeted by the criminal justice system] by virtue of their
criminality, deviance, race, and perhaps foremostly their class. In the
past, however, the rehabilitative ideal deflected criticism of a class-ori-
ented crime control policy. Presently, the bureaucraticized prison and
its constitutional edifice-the rational-basis test-perform the same de-
fensive function once born by the rehabilitative ideal. Their success
made possible a new type of prison, the warehouse prison.
252 Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 455 (1992) ("The new
penology is neither about punishing [justly] or rehabilitating individuals. It is about
identifying and managing unruly groups. It is concerned with rationality not of indi-
vidual behavior or even community organization, but of managerial process.").
253 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, OUR SECRET CONSTITUTION 2 (2001).
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popular democracy. '" 2 5 4 Its inclusive nature precludes ostracizing
inmates from the protections of the Constitution and its amend-
ments. Regardless of their crimes, inmates remain part of an or-
ganic community that marries civil society to the Equal Protection
Clause. The effects of this marriage emanate to all constitutional
amendments; they individually acquire a subtext-equal concern
and respect for the punished, including the imprisoned.
255
This subtext found new vitality in Johnson v. California, which
recognized that equal concern and respect mandates heightened
scrutiny when black and white prisoners are treated differendy.
256
However, equal concern and respect requires more than the equal
treatment of the races behind bars: It dictates that all constitu-
tional rights are consistent with incarceration, leaving no room for
Turnerization.
254 Id.
255 SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 173 (1980) (noting that the plu-
rality in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), "took this underlying theory [of an
integrated reading of the Equal Protection Clause and the Eighth Amendment ban
on cruel and unusual punishment] very seriously indeed").
256 SeeJohnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 500 (2005) (ruling that "strict scrutiny"
applies to "all racial classifications," including those used in prisons).
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